Abstract: We demonstrate the utility of discrete controller synthesis to formally assess the fault-tolerance capabilities of a dependable system from the early design stages. We start with an executable specification in order to yield a new faulttolerant executable specification. Then, we obtain manually the final distributed implementation and we formally verify its conformity to the initial fault-tolerant specification.
INTRODUCTION
This work addresses the fault-tolerance issue in discrete-event synchronous systems design. Fault occurrences must be taken into account from the early design stages of dependable systems. First, the designer must think about the functionalities of the system that may fail. Then, for each possible failure, a tolerance policy must be specified in order to limit error propagation and to ensure the correct behavior of the system, despite the failure. At the functional level, a fault-tolerance policy is described as an additional behavior that should be enabled whenever a failure occurs. Its purpose is the total or partial compensation of the loss of functionality/performance caused by the failure.
Given the complexity of a design, programming a fault-tolerance policy is a difficult task. Indeed, the designer must think of all possible evolutions that may follow the failure of a component, and distinguish which ones must be avoided. Such an approach is not realistic, as it amounts to finding all possible execution sequences that satisfy a correctness requirement of a design. In this context, we propose a formal analysis framework, allowing designers to deal with fault tolerance at the functional level of the design executable specification. The main interest of working with executable specifications is that formal techniques are much more efficient at this level, as specifications are usually more concise.
We propose to use the discrete controller synthesis (DCS) technique (Ramadge and Wonham, 1989) in its symbolic approach (Marchand et al., 2000) to generate automatically a behavior which implements fault-tolerance. We compose it with the design's executable specification, in order to yield a new fault-tolerant specification. If such a behavior does not exist, the design is not fault-tolerant: there is no means to prevent failure propagations or inconsistent executions. The executable specification should hence be redesigned.
We claim that most fault-tolerant behaviors achieve a total or partial service continuity, according to the initial formal specification of the design. Thus, we specify the nominal service of a design, and require that this service be maintained for any expected fault occurrence. DCS should then ensure the continuity of this service.
The resulting fault-tolerant specification is a nondeterministic combination of fault tolerant behaviors. To derive a deterministic fault-tolerant implementation, a definitive choice must be made among the existing behaviors. Moreover, the implementation must meet the initial architectural constraints. In practice, distributed control solutions are often required, because the target architecture is distributed. To handle distribution, we chose to address the implementation step manually. Indeed, the automatic generation of communicating distributed controllers is the only practical alternative to the manual distribution, which is not appropriate and we given our fault-tolerance goal, which prohibits the introduction of additional communication. Once an implementation has been manually obtained, its conformity to the initial fault-tolerant specification can be formally assessed. We propose to use the refinement checking technique (Grumberg and Long, 1991) in order to achieve this last step.
In the sequel, we present our general design approach and illustrate its different steps on a running example: the functional specification of a faulttolerant distributed arbiter. Then, we discuss the results of our method as well as the manual implementation aspects, and we conclude on the advantages of our approach.
THE DISTRIBUTED ARBITER
The arbiter model we use as a running example is inspired from (McMillan, 1993) . It deals with four clients (Figure 1 ) accessing a shared resource. Each client i (i = 1..4) requests access by asserting the input signal req i . The arbiter replies by asserting the proper acknowledge signal ack i only. The arbiter must achieve two basic functionalities, mutual exclusion and liveness, formally expressed with the temporal logic CTL (Clarke and Emerson, 1981) :
• Mutual Exclusion (ME): at any moment, at most one acknowledge signal may be asserted: 
is about to acknowledge its corresponding request while holding the token.
OVERVIEW OF OUR METHOD
Figure 2 presents our design and formal validation flow. A component specification with fault-tolerance requirements is first extracted from the global system specification. This specification contains a failure hypothesis that specifies the modules that are likely to fail, as well as a failure model that specifies the behavior of a faulty module. The specification is formalized through a manual coding step. At this stage, the designer only concentrates on the component's nominal functionalities to be implemented.
A fault tolerance policy is automatically generated by the DCS tool, to ensure service continuity despite failures. The result of this step is a new fault tolerant specification: a constrained model able to avoid all unwanted configurations triggered by failures. If no control solution exists, the component should be redesigned as it is not fault-tolerant.
The constrained model cannot be directly implemented, as it is usually non-deterministic and monolithic (not suitable for distribution). This is why we choose to manually implement the fault-tolerant components. However, the implementation can be formally assessed to ensure that all the implemented behaviors are part of the fault-tolerant specification.
Faults, errors, and failures
This is the fundamental causal principle in the fault pathology of dependable systems (J.C. Laprie, 1992; Jalote, 1994) . Faults are physical hazardous events. A fault may yield an error. An error may yield a failure of one or more components. A failure of one component can be viewed as a fault at the system level. Each possible failure is permanent.
We limit our study to error processing: we assume there exists a reliable external unit, which reports an error if and only if a physical fault has occurred. Failure management may involve both hardware and software or temporal redundancy. In our context, we rely on the manual introduction of hardware redundancy, followed by the automatic generation of redundant software, which exploits both the existing and the redundant hardware.
The design of dependable systems calls for a dedicated specification and validation procedure. Three key points must be taken into account: the failure hypothesis, the failure model and the fault tolerance policy.
Defining a failure hypothesis
A failure hypothesis states which components of the system may fail. If more than one component is likely to fail, failure configurations are a common way to express subsets of components that may fail together. According to this hypothesis, the remaining components are supposed to be reliable: they never fail, or if such a failure occurs, the whole system fails. The failure hypothesis needs to be confirmed by a stochastic analysis step, in order to find the probability for each failure configuration. In this document, we assume that all failure configurations specified are equally probable.
Defining a failure model
When a component fails, specify what this failure implies. This amounts to defining a behavior that is triggered by this failure. For instance, when a component fails (processor, communication link, sensor, etc.) , it may stop reacting to its environment. This means either sending a constant value, or sending random values to the environment (Byzantine behavior), or sending no value at all (fail-silent behavior).
Defining a fault tolerance policy
Ideally, a fault-tolerant system should maintain its functionalities and its performance (nominal service) even though some of its components are down. In practice, this assumption is too strict and expensive to implement. Thus, if a failure occurs, the nominal service may be replaced by a degraded operating mode. When the system runs inside a degraded mode, only a subset of its initial functional requirements are still met. We wish to achieve faulttolerance by establishing such a degraded mode when a failure occurs. In our context, this is done by building appropriate constraints that are used to control the system's behavior from outside, in order to ensure a minimal service. This approach only applies to systems that are controllable: for such systems, a set of dedicated controllable inputs is provided for service maintenance purposes. The system behavior is constrained by driving the controllable inputs appropriately. All remaining input variables are called uncontrollable. The DCS technique is an excellent choice for automatically producing such controlling constraints.
In our context, adding controllability to a design amounts to adding supplementary hardware (input variables and additional states and transitions) for backup purposes. This amounts to specifying a hardware redundancy mechanism. On the other hand, the resulting synthesized controller, if it exists, represents a "program" that appropriately uses the redundant hardware in order to establish the degraded operating mode.
DCS needs a control objective expressing faulttolerance: what the system should always do, despite failure occurrences.
SPECIFYING THE DEPENDABILITY

Failure hypothesis
We assume that only the communication links l i between cells may fail. When link l i fails, it stops transmitting tokens to the cell i. Each link is failsilent and its failure is permanent. Moreover, we assume that the probability to have a failure affecting more than one link is negligible. 
Link failure model
An abstract model for each communication link is given in Figure 3 . Each link may be either functional, in which case it transmits correctly the tokens and priority management information, or in a failure state, in which case it stops transmitting forever. The transition to the failure state is triggered by the environment and corresponds to a physical damage event.
The static priority between the cells is defined using an override/grant mechanism. Cell i overrides cell i+1 iff req i is active or if cell i−1 overrides cell i. The first cell in the chain (cell 1) cannot be overridden.
On the other hand, cell i grants cell i − 1 iff it is granted itself by cell i + 1 and if it is not holding both an incoming request and a token. The last cell in the chain (cell 4) is always granted.
Each cell i is aware of the state (running or failure) of the communication link l i it is connected to. When link l i is down, cell i stops receiving tokens. Thus, it stops complying with the specification LIV i . Moreover, a link failure invalidates the static priority scheme, as no cell can be aware anymore of other requests of higher/lower priority.
Fault tolerance policy
When link l i is down, the token keeps moving until it reaches l i , and then it is lost. From that moment, no other request will ever be acknowledged. Thus, the mutual exclusion requirement is still trivially satisfied, but the response time is no longer guaranteed for any cell. Also, the static priority scheme is disabled.
Fault-tolerance must address the response time problem, while ensuring mutual exclusion. When a link fails, we wish to appropriately constrain the arbiter behavior, so that the response time becomes acceptable. However, in its current design state, our arbiter can hardly be controlled: the incoming request or error signals should not be constrained, as they should be able to be set at any moment. Besides, the only way to constrain the behavior of a reactive system is via its input signals. Thus, in order to achieve fault-tolerance, we must redesign our arbiter interface and behavior, to make it more "controllable".
Adding controllability. When a link is down, the arbiter stops complying with its specification as soon as the token is lost. Thus, a possible solution involves adding a backup token insertion point mechanism (Figure 4) . The arbiter environment can reinsert a new token by adequately controlling this supplementary input. However, if l i is operational, backup token reinsertion has no effect.
We redesign the arbiter by assuming the existence of an external global supervisor. By asserting the backup token i signal, this supervisor inserts a new token inside the arbiter. By deasserting the backup token i signal, it prevents a new token from being inserted. Backup tokens should only be inserted when at least one link is down. However, they should not be inserted too often, as at most one token should circulate inside the arbiter. Finally, token insertion should anticipate incoming requests, so that the response time remains reasonable.
Achieving liveness Up to now, DCS handles safety and non-blocking objectives. In order to address liveness, we have chosen to replace the concept of "response in finite time" by a bounded time response requirement, which is more easily solvable by currently available DCS algorithms. This requires finding a reasonable bound on the response time for each ack i signal. Since there are four cells, and since at each cycle a new cell receives the token, we set the response bound to four cycles. Thus, the liveness requirement adapted to bounded time becomes:
The synthesized controller satisfying M E and LIV i (i = 1..4), has the following features:
• it observes every variable in the system;
• it is only allowed to control the inputs backup token i (i = 1..4) in order to constrain the arbiter to achieve its functional requirement;
• if link l i fails, the controller will re-establish the global system coherence by reinserting backup tokens through cell i, while preventing such token insertions whenever this would violate the M E requirement.
VALIDATION OF THE FT BEHAVIOR
We have modeled our arbiter and we have validated its fault-tolerance capability, by actually synthesizing a controller which ensures all the requirements stated in Section 4. For example, if link l 1 fails, the following two scenarios are possible:
x req 1 is asserted. If req 2 , req 3 , and req 4 are asserted and if links l 2 , l 3 , and l 4 are operational, then the controller enforces the fair acknowledgment of all the requests, by inserting a backup token through cell 1. The token insertion takes into account the response delay bound of each cell. Thus, a possible future violation of the delay response bound is anticipated and avoided, by enforcing the insertion of a token at the appropriate moment. y If cell j (j = 2..4) holds a token, the controller disables the insertion of a backup token until the currently existing token is lost inside link l 1 .
The control which has been synthesized is called maximally permissive: controllable inputs are only constrained w.r.t. the control objectives. Indeed, if link l i is operational, the value of the controllable input backup token i does not influence the behavior of the arbiter. If link l i is down, the input backup token i only needs to be constrained in two specific scenarios:
x As long as the ring contains a token, backup token i is set to f alse. y When the ring becomes empty (the token gets lost by link l i ), the controller enforces the introduction of a new backup token only when a possibility exists that a request is not acknowledged within the 4-cycles time bound.
The resulting controlled arbiter offers a choice among several available fault-tolerant behaviors. Because of its non-deterministic nature, we consider this result as a newly generated executable specification which embeds a set of fault-tolerant behaviors.
IMPLEMENTING AND VERIFYING THE FAULT-TOLERANT ARBITER
Implementating a deterministic fault-tolerant arbiter involves choosing one behavior among those embedded inside the fault-tolerant specification.
The architecture of the resulting controller must comply with the initial failure hypothesis. Thus, we assume that the controller cannot fail. Unfortunately, the controller achieves global control and observation; hence, such an assumption is not realistic w.r.t. the distributed architecture of the arbiter. Besides, the implementation of the controlled arbiter must also meet the architectural constraint: each cell i should be locally controlled, and the only variables the local controller is allowed to monitor should be the internal variables of cell i. The automatic generation of local controllers achieving global control objectives is a more difficult task, known as decentralized controller synthesis (Lin and Wonham, 1988) . Distributed control solutions often require supplementary communication between the local controllers. In our context, assuming reliable communication between local controllers would contradict our initial failure hypothesis, which states that communication between cells is not reliable. On the other hand, the distributed controller synthesis problem without communication between local controllers has been shown to be undecidable (Tripakis, 2002) .
As a consequence, we build local controllers manually. By construction, our arbiter has several interesting properties. First of all, the controllable inputs are "don't cares" as long as no link failure has occurred. Then, when link l i is down, only its corresponding backup token i needs to be controlled. By running a sufficient set of simulation scenarios, we isolate a set of traces that are allowed by the controlled arbiter specification and that can be played on backup token i . All these traces are composed of the following successive parts: (1) an arbitrary length prefix, corresponding to the normal operation; all along this prefix, backup token i can be set to any value; (2) once a failure occurs, a bounded-length prefix corresponds to the token propagation until it is lost; (3) finally, a periodic suffix corresponds to the periodic reinsertion of a new token once the previous one is lost.
Such a behavior is local to each cell and can be reproduced by a simple manually built deterministic finite state machine, such as the one presented in Figure 5 . Hence, by composing the arbiter with four instances of this state machine, fault-tolerance is achieved, provided that the fault hypothesis holds.
We formally assess the correctness of the above implementation by using the refinement checking technique (Grumberg and Long, 1991) . This technique is dedicated to assessing implementations . Possible implementation of a local controller for cell i against a non-deterministic operational specification. Its application in our context is efficient for two reasons: first, if an implementation refines a specification, then it inherits every ∀−CTL property satisfied by the specification (Grumberg and Long, 1991) . Our fault-tolerance objectives are compliant to the ∀−CTL subset. Thus, we can prove that the implementation is fault-tolerant. Second, refinement checking can be applied compositionally, and its complexity does not exceed the reachable state space computation of the implementation (Henzinger et al., 1998) . In our experimental framework, we carried out this step manually, as refinement checking is not an implemented feature of the control synthesis tool we have used.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Discrete Controller Synthesis (DCS) is a formal technique that builds a controller able to constrain the behavior of a specification so that it satisfies some given properties. To do this, the synthesized controller can only constrain the so called controllable inputs of the specification. We have used DCS as a design tool for assessing the fault tolerant capabilities of an executable specification. At the specification level, this assessment is only behavioral: "is my specification able to deal with faults, and if yes, how?". The synthesized controller answers this question. The benefit of our technique comes from the ability to specify the nominal service to be maintained despite fault occurrences, and to automatically generate the behavior that maintains this service. This issue cannot be addressed using model checking tools, as they do not distinguish between controllable and uncontrollable input events. To the best of our knowledge, the only available model checking tool that could also solve this question is Mocha (Henzinger et al., 1998) . However, this tool only checks the existence of a solution, without constructing it.
The whole experimentation part has been performed using the Sigali (Marchand et al., 2000) DCS tool, as well as the Matou (Maraninchi et al., 2000) mode automata environment.
Further improvements of this work include the automatic distribution of the fault-tolerant control solution. Another important research direction is the development of compositional methods dedicated for control synthesis, to efficiently deal with combinational explosion.
